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Abstract 
Prior research found conflicting results concerning the relationship between depression 
and mental state decoding ability as assessed by the ‘Eyes Test’ developed by Baron-
Cohen and colleagues. In some studies the relationship is negative, suggesting that 
depressed persons are worse than controls in decoding mental states on the basis of 
information from the eye region of others’ faces. Other research points to a positive 
relation between depression and mental state decoding. We report a study of mental state 
decoding ability in two samples of university students, one a group of students attending 
the university’s counseling service, the other a group of normal college students. The 
results are consistent in showing a negative relation between depression and mental state 
decoding ability. Possible reasons for discrepancies in research results are discussed.  
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It is well established that depression is characterized by social and interpersonal 
difficulties (Brown & Harris, 1978; Joiner & Coyne, 1999; Weissman & Paykel, 1974). 
Depressed individuals are likely to induce negative affect in others (e.g., Coyne et al., 
1987; Hokanson & Butler, 1992) and to be rejected by others (e.g., Joiner, Alfano, & 
Metalsky, 1992, 1993; Joiner & Metalsky, 1995). They also have fewer interactions with 
others (Gotlib & Lee, 1989) and find these encounters less rewarding than do their non-
depressed counterparts (Nezleck, Hampton & Shean, 2000). A natural response to this is 
to withdraw socially, which may have the effect of perpetuating the depression (Rippere, 
1980).  
One approach to understanding the association between depression and 
impairments in social functioning involves focusing on possible deficits in social 
understanding on the part of depressed persons
1
. Considerable attention has been paid to 
how depressed persons respond to facial expressions, the idea being that the ability to 
identify accurately what another person is feeling enables one to make adaptive 
adjustments to one’s behavior that in turn help to avoid conflict, provide assurance to 
another, relieve another’s distress, and so on (Hess, Kappas, & Scherer, 1988; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990). This should be rewarding for the interaction partner and thereby help to 
cement social relations. By the same token, an inability to infer another’s emotional state 
on the basis of that person’s facial displays should have negative social consequences, 
and there is evidence that this is so (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999; Persad & Polivy, 
1993). 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper we make no distinction between unipolar and bipolar depression, given that our diagnostic 
measures only assess severity of depression. It is worth noting that there is evidence that bipolar patients obtain lower 
scores than controls on measures of mentalizing (Bora, Vahip, Gonul, Akdenix, Alkan, Ogut, Eryavuz, 2005; but see 
also Montag, Ehrlich, Neuhaus, Dziobek, Heekeren, Heinz, & Gallinat, 2010). 
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A parallel approach focuses on the ability of depressed persons to ‘mentalize,’ or to 
read other people’s mental states. This work has been inspired by research on ‘theory of 
mind’ in young children (Baron-Cohen, 1995). One aspect of theory of mind is the ability 
to infer another person’s beliefs and desires on the basis of behavioral information, such 
as facial display, tone of voice, or body posture. Researchers have focused on the 
possibility that children and adults with autistic spectrum disorders (ASDs) may be 
characterized by theory of mind deficits. In this context, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, and Plumb (2001) developed the “Reading the mind in the eyes” task 
(hereafter, Eyes Test), intended to reveal subtle differences in mental state decoding 
ability between people with high functioning ASDs and normal controls. The task 
consists of 36 photographs of the eye and brow region of human faces. These are 
presented one at a time, along with four words describing mental states. The task of the 
respondent is to say which of these four states is being experienced by the person whose 
eyes are shown. While clearly related to facial-expression recognition tasks, the Eyes 
Task is qualitatively different in at least two respects. First, the Eyes Test taps a wider 
range of mental states (e.g., pensive, desire, confused, happy) than facial expression 
recognition tasks, which focus on emotional states; second, the Eyes Test gives 
participants less information on which to base their judgments. The Eyes Test is therefore 
considered to be a more sensitive measure of individuals’ ‘mentalizing’ abilities than 
traditional facial expression tasks.  
With regard to the relationship between mental state decoding and clinical 
depression, the only published paper on the subject (Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh, & 
Jacobson, 2005) reports that depressed individuals have problems with decoding mental 
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states. In this study women with moderate and severe depression had lower Eyes Test 
scores than non-depressed controls. Within the moderately and severely depressed groups 
(who did not differ from each other on Eyes Test performance), Eyes Test scores were 
predicted by severity of affective symptoms of depression, like anhedonia and guilt, 
rather than non-affective symptoms. Lee et al.’s overall finding fits well with other 
research examining emotion-decoding skills in depressed persons, which often shows that 
depressed participants perform worse that non-depressed participants when judging the 
intensity of facial expressions (Gur, Erwin, Gur, & Zwil, 1992; Surguladze et al., 2004).  
Based on this research it would be reasonable to infer that dysphoric participants –
an intermediate group between non-depressed and clinically depressed participants – 
might show a similar, negative relationship between their depression scores and mental 
decoding ability, especially for those facets of depression that are ‘affective’ in nature. 
However, Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, and Chen (2005), who studied 
mental state decoding ability in dysphoric college students, found a positive association 
between college students’ depression scores and their Eyes Test performance. Harkness 
and colleagues (2005) reported two studies in which they administered the Eyes Test to 
college students, categorized either as non-dysphoric (BDI score ≤ 12) or as dysphoric 
(BDI score > 12). In a first study of 46 female students they found that dysphoric students 
attained a significantly higher Eyes Test mean score than did their non-dysphoric 
controls. This surprising result was followed up in a second study in which 92 students 
(males and females) took part. There was again a significant positive association between 
overall depression scores (as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory, BDI) and 
performance on the Eyes Test. Harkness and colleagues explained these findings by 
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suggesting that dysphoric students might be especially vigilant processors of social 
information, perhaps motivated by a desire to regain control over their social environment 
(Weary & Edwards, 1994), giving them an advantage in decoding the relatively subtle 
cues in the Eyes Test stimuli. 
However, the argument about increased vigilance of dysphoric individuals is not 
consistent with results from related lines of research, which show that dysphoric 
participants tend to have intermediate scores, falling between depressed and normal 
samples, when it comes to impairments in social functioning. For example, it is 
established that there is a lowered ability to generate positive facial expressions in 
clinically depressed participants (Schwartz, Fair, Salt, Mandel, & Klerman, 1976). A 
parallel pattern is found in normal controls who are categorized into dysphoric and non-
dysphoric based on their BDI scores (e.g., Sloan, Bradley, Dimoulas, & Lang, 2002).  
Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, which consistently finds that 
depressed participants do worse than controls on positive and/or neutral items (Gur et al., 
1992; Surguladze et al., 2004) but not on negative items, Harkness et al. (2005) found 
that item valence did not interact with dysphoria; dysphoric students performed better 
than non-dysphoric students regardless of item valence. 
The present research aims to re-examine the relationship between 
depression/dysphoria and mental state decoding ability. We do this by investigating two 
samples: a sample of moderately-to-severely depressed students who attended a 
counseling service (counseling group), which was intended to be broadly equivalent to 
Lee et al.’s (2005) depressed sample; and a sample of normal college students, who 
ranged in their depression scores from non-dysphoric to dysphoric (college group). This 
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latter group was intended to be equivalent to Harkness et al.’s (2005) sample. Our data-
analytic approach focuses on the correlations between depression scores (as measured by 
BDI-II and HADS-D, see below) and overall Eyes Test performance in the two groups. In 
addition to this main analysis, we explore whether participants show differential 
performance on the Eyes Test as a function of item valence.  
Finally, we test the explanation proposed by Lee et al. (2005) for the inconsistency 
between the findings of Lee et al. (2005) with clinically depressed participants and those 
of Harkness et al. (2005) with dysphoric participants. Lee et al. (2005) noted that their 
participants met the DSM-IV criteria for a major depressive episode, whereas those in 
Harkness et al.’s (2005) study did not. Thus, they argued, the differences in the results 
between the two samples may have been due to the differences in qualitative aspects of 
their dysphoria. They supported this claim by reference to the fact that in their study it 
was the affective symptoms of depression rather than non-affective symptoms that were a 
better predictor of Eyes Test performance among depressed individuals. They suggested 
that affective symptoms of depression are especially likely to be associated with a lack of 
interest in others, and as a consequence clinically depressed individuals are likely to 
perform less well on mental state decoding tasks such as the Eyes Test.  
This argument implies that the negative correlation between affective symptoms 
and Eyes Test performance will be smaller in non-depressed samples than in severely 
depressed samples, and that the positive correlation between Eyes Test performance and 
overall BDI scores in (non-depressed) dysphoric samples observed by Harkness et al. 
(2005) would be driven by a positive correlation between non-affective symptoms of 
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depression and Eyes Test scores. Another goal of the present research was to examine 
these implications.   
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty-nine students participated in this study. One hundred and sixteen 
were undergraduate students studying a range of disciplines; what they had in common 
was that they were clients of the university’s counseling service. Of these, 91 (71 
females, 20 males) satisfied our selection criterion of being at least mildly depressed 
(BDI-II score > 14; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) and were therefore retained for further 
analysis as ‘counseling group’. Their average age was 22.22 years (SD = 5.21). The other 
73 (67 females, 5 males, one participant did not provide gender information) were 
undergraduate students of psychology at the same university who participated in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. These students comprised the college group. Their 
average age was 19.42 (SD = 1.34). 
Materials 
Eyes Test. The task consists of 36 black-and-white photographs of the eye region of 
human faces (revised version; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). These are presented one at a 
time, along with four words describing mental states (e.g., aghast, fantasizing, impatient, 
alarmed). The task of the respondent is to say which of these four states is being 
experienced by the person whose eyes are shown. For the valence analysis, we 
categorized the items into positive (4 items: playful, fantasizing, thoughtful, friendly), 
negative (6 items: upset, worried, regretful, accusing, doubtful, and preoccupied) and 
neutral (8 items: desire, insisting, uneasy, despondent, preoccupied, cautious, skeptical, 
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anticipating), following the classifications proposed by Harkness et al. (2005) and also 
used by Lee et al. (2005).  Harkness et al. made these classifications based on a pilot 
study of 12 non-dysphoric women, who rated the emotional valence of the stimuli in the 
Eyes Test from 1 – very negative, to 4 – neutral, to 7 – very positive. 
Depression and anxiety measures. We used two measures of depression to assess 
the presence and severity of depression in our samples: the Beck Depression Inventory II 
(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), a 21-item measure of depression, and the Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1993), a 14-item measure of anxiety 
(HADS-A subscale) and depression (HADS-D subscale). Both instruments are widely 
used in the literature and have good psychometric properties (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & 
Neckelmann, 2002; Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). The reliabilities of the 
depression and anxiety measures in our sample were high (BDI, α =  .94; HADS-D, α = 
.88; HADS-A, α = .87). 
Procedure 
Participants in both groups took part on a voluntary basis, and it was made clear on the 
consent form completed before any data were collected that they were free not to respond 
to any items and that they could withdraw at any stage of the research without incurring 
any penalty. Participants were asked to complete three measures (BDI-II, HADS, and 
Eyes Test) and to supply some demographic information. The three measures were 
administered in a counterbalanced order. Participants also indicated their age, gender, and 
whether or not English was their first language. In addition to these variables, participants 
in the counseling group reported their major subject of study.  
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The three measures were presented in paper-and-pencil form and participants 
worked at their own pace. Participants in the college group signed up to take part in the 
study at one of a designated set of times and completed the battery of questionnaires in 
small groups. A researcher was present to give instructions, answer any questions, and 
ensure that participants completed the measures individually, without discussion. 
Participants in the counseling group were asked at their initial counseling session whether 
they would be willing to take part in the research; those who agreed to do so completed 
the questionnaires in the presence of a researcher who gave instructions and answered 
any questions.  
Results 
Preliminary analysis and treatment of outliers 
Inspection of BDI-II scores revealed one outlier in the college group with a score more 
than 3 standard deviations greater than the mean; it was therefore changed to the value of 
the next highest BDI score plus one. The same procedure was adopted for outliers in the 
Eyes Test total scores (2 outliers) and the Eyes Test neutral items scores (1 outlier). 
Participants in the counseling group were significantly more anxious and depressed 
(whether indexed by BDI-II or HADS depression scores) than were those in the college 
group. The relevant means, standard deviations, and t values are shown in Table 1. 
Counseling group 
Correlations between BDI-II, HADS, and Eyes Test performance. Correlations among the 
key measures for counseling group participants are shown in Table 2. The measures of 
depression and anxiety are significantly and strongly inter-related. As predicted, there are 
negative correlations between the two indices of depression and performance on the Eyes 
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Test. More specifically, there is a significant correlation between Eyes Test scores and 
HADS-D depression scores, and between Eyes Test scores and BDI-II scores. Partial 
correlations controlling for HADS-A scores (to check whether the relation between 
depression and Eyes Test scores was independent of individual differences in anxiety), 
showed that the correlation with BDI-II is still marginally significant, r(87) = -.20, p = 
.056, and the correlation with HADS-D scores remains significant, r(87) = -.25, p = .016.  
Valence analysis. We correlated percent correct for each of the three valence 
subscales of Eyes Test (positive, neutral and negative) with measures of depression and 
anxiety. These correlations were not significant for the negative or positive sub-scores (ps 
≥ .17). For the neutral subscale, however, there were significant correlations with BDI-II 
scores, r(88) = -.23, p = .028, and with HADS-D scores, r(88) = - .29, p = .006, but not 
with HADS-A scores, r(88) = -.11, p = .294. After controlling for the HADS-A scores, 
the correlation becomes marginally significant for the BDI-II scores, r(87) = -.21, p = 
.054, but remains significant for the HADS-D scores, r(87) = -.27, p = .011. When we 
compared the significance of the difference between the correlations between depression 
scores, on the one hand, and scores on the three valence subscales, on the other, using 
Fisher r-to-z transformations, we did not find any significant differences.  
Affective and non-affective BDI subscales. To test Lee et al.’s argument that the 
difference between their and Harkness et al.’s results was due to the fact that affective 
symptoms were negatively correlated in clinically depressed individuals but not in 
dysphoric individuals, we first divided the BDI-II items into affective (9 items, including 
guilt, anhedonia, and suicadality, α = .89) and non-affective (the remaining 12 items, α = 
.89) subscales, and then tested whether scores on these two sub-scales were differentially 
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related to Eyes Test performance by regressing Eyes Test scores on the affective and non-
affective subscales of BDI-II. We ran a stepwise regression analysis with affective and 
non-affective symptoms as predictor variables and Eyes Test scores as the outcome 
variable. The final model was significant, R
2
 = .058, F(1, 88) = 5.42, p = .022, and 
contained only affective symptoms as a predictor; non-affective symptoms were excluded 
from the model because this variable failed to meet the threshold p value (.05) for 
inclusion. Consistent with Lee et al.’s hypothesis, Eyes Test performance was 
significantly negatively related to affective symptoms, standardized β = -.241, p = .022, 
but not to non-affective symptoms, standardized β = -.044, ns. 
The results for the counseling group therefore broadly replicate the findings of 
Lee et al. (2005), who showed that in clinical samples affective symptoms of depression 
were a better predictor of Eyes Test performance than non-affective symptoms. Also 
consistent with Lee et al. is the absence of a differential relation between depression 
scores and Eyes Test scores as a function of item valence. Although we found a 
significant negative relationship between Eyes Test performance and depression scores 
for neutral items, but not for positive or negative items, the correlation for neutral items 
was not significantly stronger than those for positive or negative items.  
College group 
Correlations between BDI-II, HADS, and Eyes Test performance. Correlations 
among the key measures for college group participants are shown in Table 3. It can be 
seen that here, too, the measures of depression and anxiety are significantly and strongly 
inter-related. More importantly, there is a significant negative correlation between Eyes 
Test performance and BDI-II scores, and a negative but non-significant correlation 
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between Eyes Test performance and HADS-D depression scores. The correlation between 
Eyes Test scores and BDI-II scores is marginally significant (r(67) = -.22 p = .068) after 
controlling for HADS-A scores. 
Dysphoria and mental state decoding. We categorized our college sample into 
dysphoric (BDI-II score of 12 or more, M = 20.43, SD = 5.26, N = 14) and non-dysphoric 
(BDI-II score of less than 12, M = 5.39, SD = 3.46, N = 56)
2
, and ran an independent-
samples t-test on Eyes Test performance. Like Harkness and colleagues, we found a 
significant effect of dysphoria on mental state decoding, t(68) = 2.29, p = .025, d = 0.56, 
but we did not observe what Harkness et al. called a ‘dysphoric advantage’; on the 
contrary, it was non-dysphoric students who scored higher (M = 28.25, SD = 3.21) than 
dysphoric students (M = 26.07, SD = 3.08).  This relationship remained significant when 
dysphoria was entered as a between-group factor in a one-way ANOVA with HADS-A 
scores as a covariate, F(1, 67) = 4.55, p = .037, η2 = .064. 
Valence analysis. For the college sample, we correlated percent correct for 
positive, negative and neutral items with the measures of depression and anxiety. As for 
the counseling group, there were no significant correlations for positive or negative item 
sub-scores (ps ≤ .699). For the neutral items, however, there was a significant negative 
correlation with BDI-II, r(68) = -.29, p = .015, a negative but non-significant correlation 
with HADS-D scores, r(68) = -.20, p = .101, and a negative but non-significant 
correlation with HADS-A scores, r(73) = -.14, p = .229. After controlling for HADS-A 
scores, the correlation with BDI-II scores remained significant, r(67) = -.29, p = .017. As 
was the case with the Counseling group, the correlation between depression scores and 
                                                 
2
 A BDI score of 12 was used by Harkness and colleagues as a cut-off for categorizing their participants into 
dysphoric/non-dysphoric subgroups. For ease of comparison we adopted the same criteria.  
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the neutral items was not significantly stronger than the corresponding correlations with 
positive or negative items. 
Affective and non-affective BDI subscales. As before, we ran a forward stepwise 
regression with affective and non-affective subscales of BDI-II as predictor variables and 
Eyes Test scores as the outcome variable. The final model was significant, R
2 
= .078, F(1, 
68) = 5.76, p = .019, and contained only affective symptoms as a predictor; the non-
affective symptoms variable was not included in the model. As for the counseling group, 
and again consistent with Lee et al.’s hypothesis, Eyes Test performance was 
significantly negatively related to affective symptoms, standardized β = -.279, p = .019, 
but not to non-affective symptoms, standardized β = .13, ns. 
The results for the college group, therefore, do not replicate the pattern observed 
by Harkness and colleagues (2005), who found that dysphoric students performed better 
on the test of mental state decoding. Our findings are more consistent with those of 
Harkness et al. when it comes to the role of item valence: although there was a tendency 
for the relation between dysphoria and mental state decoding to be more evident when the 
mental states were neutral, this relationship was not significantly stronger than the 
corresponding relationships with items representing positive or negative mental states. A 
final point is that the findings from the college group provide no support for Lee et al.’s 
(2005) explanation for the differences between their findings and those of Harkness et al. 
First, we did not observe a positive relationship between the non-affective symptoms of 
depression and mental state decoding ability; second, as in the counseling group, it was 
the affective symptoms of depression that were a better predictor of the impaired Eyes 
Test performance than non-affective symptoms of depression; and finally, the affective 
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symptoms of depression were not a weaker predictor of Eyes Test scores in the college 
group (standardized β = -.401) than in the counseling group (standardized β = -.241).  
Analyses across groups 
To examine the relation between depression and mental state decoding in the 
sample as a whole, we divided BDI scores into three categories (0–12, non-dysphoric, n = 
56; 13–29: moderately dysphoric, n = 73; 30 and over, severely dysphoric, n = 32) and 
ran a one-way ANOVA on the Eyes Test scores of all participants, collapsing across 
group. This analysis revealed that the overall relation between BDI and Eyes Test scores 
was significant, F(2, 157) = 3.53, p = .032, η2 = .043, such that the Eyes Test scores of the 
non-dysphoric group (M = 28.25, SD = 3.21) were higher than those of moderately 
dysphoric group (M = 27.30, SD = 3.70), which were in turn higher than those of the 
severely dysphoric group (M = 26.20, SD = 3.62). Post hoc comparisons showed that the 
non-dysphoric group differed significantly (p = .028) from the severely dysphoric group. 
Finally, we revisited the issue of the role of item valence by computing 
correlations between depression scores and Eyes Test scores separately for negative, 
neutral, and positive Eyes Test items. The correlations are shown in Table 4. There is 
tendency for depression scores to be significantly and negatively related to performance 
on the neutral and positive (but not the negative) Eyes Test items. The strength of this 
relation is marginally significantly greater for neutral items than for negative items (z = 
1.88, p = .060, and z = 1.94, p = .052, respectively, for the BDI-II and HADS-D 
measures). The difference in strength of relation between the positive and negative Eyes 
Test items is not statistically significant (z = 1.62, p = .11, and z = 1.18, p = .24, 
respectively, for the BDI-II and HADS-D). 
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Discussion 
We set out to examine the relationship between depression scores (as measured by BDI-II 
and HADS) and mental state decoding ability in two samples of students: a counseling 
group consisting of students who were clients of the university’s counseling service and 
were at least moderately depressed (BDI-II > 14); and a college group consisting of 
students who were not attending the university’s counseling service.  
For the counseling group, based on Lee et al.’s (2005) results, we anticipated that 
there would be a negative relationship between affective symptoms of depression and 
mental state decoding ability. Consistent with their results, we found that Eyes Test 
performance was better predicted by affective symptoms of depression than by non-
affective symptoms. For the college group we sought to explore whether Harkness et al.’s 
(2005) finding of a positive relation between depression and mental state decoding ability 
would be replicated. In contrast to their findings, we observed a negative correlation 
between mental state decoding ability and depression scores. In addition, we analyzed the 
sample as a whole, collapsing across counseling and college groups. This analysis also 
showed that depression symptoms are negatively related to mental state decoding ability, 
with minimally depressed participants performing significantly better than their severely 
depressed counterparts. 
We also examined whether the relationship between mental state decoding ability 
and depression scores differed as a function of item valence. Lee et al. (2005) found that 
valence did not interact with group (non-depressed vs. moderately depressed vs. severely 
depressed) to affect accuracy on the Eyes Test, whereas Harkness et al. (2005) found that 
dysphoric participants had scored higher than non-dysphoric participants on all types of 
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items. Both sets of findings contrast with the generally reported finding that depression is 
associated with a tendency to interpret positive and/or neutral stimuli, but not negative 
stimuli, in negative terms (e.g., Gur et al., 1992; Murphy et al., 1999; Suslow, Junghanns, 
& Arolt, 2001). Our findings are more compatible with this pattern. Although there was 
no significant difference in the strength of the relation between depression scores and 
Eyes Test scores as a function of items valence when the counseling and college group 
data were analyzed separately, there was a trend for the relation to be stronger for neutral 
than for negative items when the data from both groups were analyzed together. This 
pattern of relationships could be regarded as reflecting a selective influence of negative 
affective states on Eyes Test performance, with neutral states being less well recognized 
due to negative schemas biasing responses to such items, although such an interpretation 
needs to be treated with caution in view of the fact that the difference in the strength of 
the correlations did not exceed the conventional threshold for statistical significance. 
Finally, we explored whether Lee et al.’s (2005) suggestion that the different 
relations between depression and mental state decoding ability observed by them and by 
Harkness et al. (2005) reflect qualitative differences in depression. Their argument 
suggests that a negative correlation between affective symptoms of depression and mental 
state decoding should be found for the more severely depressed individuals in the 
counseling group, but not in the college group; it also suggests that in the college group 
any non-significant correlation of affective symptoms with mental state decoding ability 
should be offset by a positive correlation between non-affective symptoms and Eyes Test 
scores. This is not what our results showed. We found that affective symptoms were a 
better predictor than non-affective symptoms of Eyes Test performance in both groups. 
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Thus our results corroborate Lee et al.’s (2005) findings regarding the differential 
influence of affective and non-affective symptoms on mental state decoding, but not their 
argument that differences in affective symptoms of depressions between severely 
depressed and dysphoric individuals can account for the difference between their results 
and the results reported by Harkness et al. (2005).  
There are several ways in which the present findings are inconsistent with those 
reported by Harkness et al. (2005). In trying to account for these inconsistencies, it is 
worth considering whether sample or procedural differences might have played a role. 
Other than nationality (Harkness et al.’s participants were students at a Canadian 
university and were presumably predominantly of Canadian nationality; those in the 
current study were students at a British university and all but 8 of those in the college 
group were British) there are no salient differences between the two samples with respect 
to mean age, mean BDI score or mean Eyes Test score. One clear procedural difference 
between the two studies is that Harness et al. used a computerized administration of the 
Eyes Test in which participants were encouraged to respond quickly as well as 
accurately, and the Eyes Test items were embedded in a broader set of items in which 
participants had to select one of four possible adjectives to describe each of 12 pictured 
animals and to judge whether 12 of the Eyes Test items depicted male or female faces. By 
contrast, we used paper-and-pencil administration of the Eyes Test, participants were not 
put under any pressure to respond quickly, and there were no items other than Eyes Test 
items. These procedural differences are large, yet it seems unlikely that they could 
account for the inconsistencies between the two sets of findings, because Lee et al. (2005) 
used a procedure identical to that used by Harkness et al. and found results that are 
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similar to ours. Given the degree of consistency between Lee et al.’s results and our own, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that Harkness et al.’s finding that depression and mental 
state decoding ability are positively related may be an atypical finding, as well as being 
one that is also less easily accommodated into the broader literature on depression. 
Although there are two published studies that appear at first sight to be consistent 
with Harkness et al.’s (2005) findings, on closer examination they do not provide 
evidence for a ‘dysphoric advantage’ when it comes to mental state decoding. Converse, 
Lin, Keysar, and Epley (2008) found that induced mood (happy vs. sad) is related to 
performance on a theory of mind task. In particular, they found that happy participants 
performed less well than sad participants when asked to predict the behaviour of a person 
in a scenario. However, the effect Converse et al. observed was not driven by sad 
participants: When the authors included a third, neutral condition in a follow-up study, 
sad participants did not differ in theory of mind performance from participants in the 
neutral condition.  
Harkness, Jacobson, Duong, and Sabbagh (2010) found that participants with a 
prior history of clinical depression who responded to a happy-mood induction with a 
happy mood performed worse on the Eyes Test than did counterparts who were 
unresponsive to the happy mood induction. However, there was no parallel effect for 
participants assigned to a sad mood induction condition. Thus participants who were 
responsive to the sad mood induction did not perform better on the Eyes Test than did 
participants who were unresponsive. Furthermore, for never-depressed participants, there 
was also no effect in the sad mood induction condition. So dysphoria as indexed by level 
of sad mood in the sad mood induction conditions was unrelated to Eyes Test 
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performance.  
Conclusion 
We examined the relationship between dysphoria/depression and mental state decoding in 
a counseling sample and a college sample. The results for the counseling group broadly 
replicated Lee et al.’s (2005) findings, showing that more seriously depressed participants 
have impaired mental state decoding and that it is the affective symptoms of depression 
that are associated with poorer mentalizing ability. However, the results for the college 
group are inconsistent with Harkness et al.’s (2005) findings, in that there was no 
evidence that dysphoric participants were characterized by better mental state decoding. 
By contrast, we found that mental state decoding ability was impaired in dysphoric 
college students.  
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and t values for measures of depression and anxiety 
 
Measure     
Group 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
t 
 
p 
 
d 
BDI-II      
College 
Counseling                    
 
8.40 
28.07 
 
7.17 
9.09 
 
15.34 
 
< .001 
 
2.40 
HADS-D   
College 
Counseling 
 
2.53 
8.71 
 
2.33 
4.09 
 
12.15 
 
< .001 
 
1.95 
HADS-A  
College 
Counseling 
 
7.21 
13.26 
 
3.62 
3.90 
 
10.21 
 
< .001 
 
1.61 
 
Note. BDI-II is the Beck Depression Inventory, revised version; HADS-D is the 
depression subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; HADS-A is the 
anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. 
 
 
 
  Mental-state decoding 
  27 
Table 2. Correlations among depression, anxiety, and mental state decoding ability scores 
in counseling group (n = 91) 
 
Measure 
 
 
BDI-II 
 
 
HADS-D 
 
 
HADS-A 
 
 
HADS-D 
 
 
.64** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HADS-A 
 
 
.56** 
 
 
.44** 
 
 
 
 
Eyes Test 
 
 
-.23* 
 
 
-.28** 
 
 
-.11 
 
 
Note. BDI-II is the Beck Depression Inventory, revised version; HADS-D is the 
depression subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; HADS-A is the 
anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
* - p < .05; ** - p < .01 
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Table 3. Correlations among depression, anxiety, and mental state decoding ability scores 
in college group (n = 73) 
 
Measure 
 
 
BDI-II 
 
 
HADS-D 
 
 
HADS-A 
 
 
HADS-D 
 
 
.82** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HADS-A 
 
 
.58** 
 
 
.58** 
 
 
 
 
Eyes Test 
 
 
-.24* 
 
 
-.12 
 
 
-.10 
 
 
Note. BDI-II is the Beck Depression Inventory, revised version; HADS-D is the 
depression subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; HADS-A is the 
anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. 
 * - p < .05   ** -  p < .01 
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Table 4. Correlations between depression scores and Eyes Test scores as a function of 
item valence. 
 
 Negative Positive Neutral 
BDI-II -.026 
ns 
n = 160 
-.206 
p = .009 
n = 160 
-.234 
p = .003 
n = 160 
HADS-D -.046 
ns 
n = 163 
-.176 
p = .025 
n = 163 
-.257 
p = .001 
n = 163 
 
